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R&D Partnership Portfolios and the Inflow of Technological Knowledge 
 
Abstract 
This paper links research on parallel search and joint R&D to contribute a portfolio perspective to 
the study of knowledge flows within interfirm R&D partnerships. In a longitudinal analysis of 
firms engaged in R&D partnerships relating to information technology between 1975 and 1999, 
we show that the size of a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio and its share of novel partners both 
have an inverted U-shaped effect on the inflow of technological knowledge from the firm’s R&D 
partners. We also show how these direct effects vary as a function of the level of technological 
uncertainty within the portfolio.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Firms engaged in technological innovation face great uncertainty about the future value of new 
technologies, products, and processes (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) and 
crucial knowledge necessary to make research and development decisions in the face of such 
uncertainty is often scattered across industry segments. Therefore, many firms have assembled 
portfolios of R&D partnerships to scan multiple external sources of knowledge, allowing them to 
reduce technological uncertainty, shorten their innovation time span, and increase their 
performance (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Powell, 
Koput, Smith-Doerr, & Owen-Smith, 1999). Recent studies argue that R&D partnership 
portfolios, more than individual partnerships alone, represent key knowledge-gathering conduits 
that allow firms to leverage informational complementarities across their various R&D projects 
(Faems, van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; George, Zahra, Wheatley, & Khan, 2001; Munson & 
Spivey, 2006). Consistent with this view, several studies have shown empirical associations 
between R&D partnership portfolios and innovation (Powell et al., 1999; Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2006; Soh, 2003; Stuart, 2000; Wuyts, Dutta, & Stremersch, 2004), while others have suggested a 
link between technological uncertainty and firms’ proclivity to engage in multiple simultaneous 
R&D partnerships (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rosenkopf & 
Schilling, 2008).  
However, while research to date has provided important insights into R&D partnership 
portfolios, a number of issues have remained underexplored. For example, though prior studies 
have tended to assume that knowledge flows represent a proximate consequence of R&D 
partnership portfolios (e.g., Soh, 2003; Wuyts et al., 2004), direct evidence on such knowledge 
flows is largely restricted to studies of dyadic partnerships (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, & 
Jaffe, 2006; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Oxley & Wada 2009; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 
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2003). Empirical research has yet to connect dimensions of R&D partnership portfolios directly 
to the inflow of technological knowledge from a firm’s R&D partners. In addition, the level of 
technological uncertainty varies considerably across a firm’s R&D partnerships, which likely 
influences the knowledge-gathering effect of its partnership portfolio (e.g., Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Nelson, 1961). Nevertheless, available evidence provides limited insight into the effects of 
technological uncertainty on knowledge gathering in R&D partnership portfolios of varying size 
and composition. 
In light of these issues, we aim to contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature on 
R&D partnerships in two ways. First, we bridge the gap between theory and evidence by 
providing a direct test of the proposition that an R&D partnership portfolio has predictable and 
substantive effects on the inflow of technological knowledge from a firm’s partners. In particular, 
we examine whether portfolio size and its composition – i.e., the mix of novel and repeat partners 
– affect inward knowledge flows. Evidence on such relationships contributes to our 
understanding of the mechanisms that prior work has assumed, explicitly or implicitly, to drive 
the performance correlates of R&D partnership portfolios. 
Second, we develop and test a contingency perspective that considers how the extent of 
technological uncertainty characterizing a firm’s R&D partnerships affects inward knowledge 
flows in portfolios of different size and composition. To do so, we first distinguish research- and 
development-oriented partnerships as indicators of, respectively, higher and lower technological 
uncertainty. Drawing on the literature on parallel research and development efforts within firms 
(e.g., Nelson, 1961), we then argue that the extent to which a portfolio is composed of research-
oriented partnerships affects the optimal portfolio size and partner mix. This contingency view 
extends nascent understanding of R&D partnership portfolios by suggesting that optimal portfolio 
design varies with the types of projects comprising those portfolios. 
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We define an R&D partnership portfolio as a firm’s set of partnerships formed with other 
firms to share existing technologies and develop new technologies, products, and processes. We 
define inward knowledge flows as the knowledge flows a firm draws from its R&D partners and 
that relate to the development of technological innovations. We evaluate our hypotheses using a 
panel dataset on the innovative and partnering activities of firms engaged in R&D partnerships 
related to information technology (IT) during 1975-1999. To allow for a conservative test of our 
theory, we exploit rich longitudinal data by incorporating fixed effects for firms and years, and a 
wide range of time-varying controls at the firm, portfolio, and partner level. 
KNOWLEDGE GATHERING IN R&D PARTNERSHIP PORTFOLIOS 
Technological innovation is essential to a firm’s commercial and financial performance (Bayus, 
Erickson, & Jacobson, 2003; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005) and so developing valuable 
innovation projects represents a key managerial challenge (Freeman & Soete, 1997). An 
important complication in innovation is that the future value of new technologies, products, and 
processes is inherently uncertain. Among other uncertainty-reduction strategies, the formation of 
R&D partnerships represents a major factor helping firms to address this challenge (Hagedoorn, 
1993; Powell et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000). R&D partnerships help reduce uncertainty in particular 
because they allow a firm to gather information, by providing access to externally available 
technological knowledge (Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006; Mowery et al., 1996; Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003). 
Recent studies suggest that R&D partnership portfolios, more than individual partnerships 
alone, represent key knowledge-gathering conduits because a portfolio allows a firm to leverage 
informational complementarities across its various R&D projects (Faems et al., 2005; George et 
al., 2001; Munson & Spivey, 2006; Soh, 2003). This portfolio argument echoes insights provided 
by the literature on parallel search in research and development projects (Abernathy & 
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Rosenbloom, 1969; Childs & Triantis, 1999; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Nelson, 1961). These 
studies have compared the ‘classic’ sequential project selection model to a parallel search 
approach. In the sequential model, firms bet all resources on one ‘best evidence’ R&D project and 
only consider alternative projects if the initial investments have proven unsuccessful. However, in 
the face of significant uncertainty – e.g., when the project concerns novel, cutting-edge 
technologies and the competitive environment forces short development cycles – such a 
sequential strategy is risky. Sequential evaluation of approaches means that firms lose costly time 
and resources by investing in new projects only after earlier projects have failed. 
Alternatively, under technological uncertainty, a firm can benefit from investment in a 
portfolio of parallel R&D projects. This way, the firm avoids the risks of a priori decision making 
about uncertain R&D projects. Instead of picking an early winner and so potentially cutting off 
promising alternative options, ‘parallelism’ generates information about the future value of a 
broader range of products and technologies. Nelson (1961) demonstrated that a parallel 
investment approach can be cost effective in the long run because it generates an investment 
decision that is based on more information while, as compared with the later stages of an 
innovation trajectory, the costs of R&D are still relatively low. 
The benefits typically attributed to a portfolio of internal R&D projects (Abernathy & 
Rosenbloom, 1969) – e.g., long run cost efficiency, information gains, hedging against the risk of 
individual project failure, generating competing perspectives on novel technologies, and boosting 
technological competencies – are also relevant for a portfolio of external R&D partnerships. 
Therefore, convergent with the literatures on parallel search and R&D partnership portfolios, we 
develop the argument that a portfolio of parallel R&D partnerships will directly help innovating 
firms gather the requisite technological knowledge to counter technological uncertainty. In 
particular, we first focus on the effects of portfolio size and composition – i.e., the mix of novel 
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and repeat partners – on the amount of technological knowledge a firm draws from its R&D 
partners. Second, we argue that these direct effects vary with the level of technological 
uncertainty within an R&D partnership portfolio. 
Portfolio Size 
A key premise of the literature on parallel search is that increases in the number of parallel 
projects generate informational benefits that help firms make better technology-related investment 
decisions (Nelson, 1961). As Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel (2000: 471) argue, “the experience of 
firms in technologically sophisticated industries with extremely short product life cycles shows 
(…) that pursuit of many alternatives is the best way of understanding the advantages and 
disadvantages of each, and so contributes to selection of the best current possibilities.” Within the 
R&D partnership literature, some results are consistent with this premise. For example, Ahuja 
(2000), Powell et al. (1999), and Soh (2003) show correlations between a firm’s number of 
simultaneous R&D partnerships and their patenting and new product performance. In general, 
firms with a portfolio of R&D partnerships have access to more external technological 
knowledge, which helps them to improve their estimates of potentially valuable technologies. 
Such firms will also develop capabilities to learn from a range of partners, which decreases the 
likelihood that they fail to locate relevant technological knowledge and in turn increases their 
ability to compare the value of divergent bits of knowledge (Powell et al., 1996). 
However, beyond an optimum number of parallel partnerships, added costs should start to 
outweigh any portfolio benefits (cf. Nelson, 1961: 356-357). If so, then the marginal effect of 
additional R&D partnerships decreases, and perhaps becomes negative, with an increase in the 
size of a portfolio. Firms will enter the most promising partnerships first and so the amount of 
relevant information drawn from additional partners, and the concomitant potential for uncertainty 
reduction, should gradually decrease (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Moreover, increasing the size 
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of a portfolio increases burdens on their management and monitoring (Deeds & Hill, 1996). 
Beyond a certain portfolio size, additional R&D partnerships generate an overexposure to 
information, which in turn increases the cognitive strain on those responsible for inspecting and 
monitoring such partnerships. Together, these arguments suggest that initial increases in portfolio 
size increase the inflow of technological knowledge but only up to a point. Beyond an optimum 
portfolio size, the inflow of technological knowledge gradually decreases. 
Hypothesis 1. The inward flow of technological knowledge from a firm’s R&D partners first 
increases and then decreases with the size of the firm’s R&D partnership portfolio. 
 
Portfolio Composition: Combining Novel and Repeat Partners 
Apart from the size of an R&D partnership portfolio, its composition in terms of the mix of novel 
and repeat partners may also influence inward flows of technological knowledge (e.g., Wuyts et 
al., 2004). In uncertain environments, firms tend to engage in partnerships with firms they have 
collaborated with before (Gulati 1995). Such repeat collaboration promotes the development of 
cooperative routines, especially in the area of R&D in which tacit knowledge sharing requires 
rich interactions among the personnel of the sponsoring firms (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; 
Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Thus, the inflow of technological knowledge from R&D partners 
increases with repeat collaboration. 
Although repeat collaboration might initially increase knowledge inflows into the focal 
firm, there may be decreasing marginal returns to repeated engagements with prior partners. For 
example, Gulati (1995) shows that the relation between prior partnerships and future partnership 
formation at the dyad level is an inverted U-shaped one and Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) 
suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship between repeat partnerships and alliance success. 
Beyond a certain threshold, additional information benefits of repeat partnerships may thus dry 
up. Indeed, Hagedoorn and Frankort (2008) indicated that during the 1990s, IBM’s extensive 
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R&D partnerships with firms like Apple, Siemens, Toshiba, and HP appeared to have eventually 
exhausted opportunities for interfirm learning. This led IBM to engage in partnerships with a new 
set of firms that had not featured prominently in its R&D partnership portfolio before. Hence, an 
overdependence on prior partners ultimately eliminates further information benefits. 
In high tech industries characterized by continual exit and entry of firms, useful sources for 
novel perspectives are unlikely to reside infinitely within a firm’s group of repeat partners. 
Consequently, cooperation with R&D partners that have no prior partnerships to the firm 
provides welcome access to novel technological perspectives (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Novel 
partners enrich the opportunity set a firm faces versus its competition, which allows the firm to 
reduce technological uncertainty and increase its prospects for promising technologies. 
At the portfolio level, these arguments imply that though repeat partnerships are valuable 
due to increasingly fine-grained information sharing, novel partnerships are valuable as they 
infuse the firm with new information with higher marginal benefits. Hence, a firm maintaining a 
portfolio with both repeat partners and novel ones balances the informational benefits of 
relational routines with higher marginal returns of information drawn from novel partners. Repeat 
partnerships would predominantly deepen a firm’s technological understanding, while novel 
partnerships would instead enrich the focal firms’ perspectives on new technologies (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf 2006). As excessive depth would ultimately lock a firm into one technological 
direction and excessive breadth would challenge the cognitive abilities of a firm to make sense of 
disparate bits of technological knowledge, R&D partnership portfolios that mix novel and repeat 
partners should generate the largest inflow of technological knowledge. Thus, the share of novel 
partners in a portfolio will have an inverted U-shaped effect on inward knowledge flows.1 
Hypothesis 2. The inward flow of technological knowledge from a firm’s partners first 
increases and then decreases with the share of novel partners in the firm’s R&D 
partnership portfolio. 
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Research versus Development Focus: the Contingency of Technological Uncertainty 
The level of technological uncertainty is a key factor that determines the value of a parallel R&D 
approach and it varies across the different stages of the innovation process (Abernathy & 
Rosenbloom, 1969; Nelson, 1961; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Specifically, it should decrease 
over time (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). Consequently, we expect to observe differences between, 
on the one hand, firms that focus on early-stage experimental, basic or applied research projects 
within their R&D partnership portfolios and, on the other hand, firms that focus more on 
partnerships aimed at the further development and refinement of existing technologies. 
Early-stage experimental and applied research is rife with uncertainties. Firms face many 
technological options and, therefore, many different directions for potential research projects 
(Freeman & Soete, 1997; Nelson, 1961, 1982). Across these options, the information availability 
ranges from no information to crude ideas about various technological attributes and their relation 
to economic payoffs. The sequencing of research steps is unclear ex ante as means-ends 
connections await establishment and concrete performance information is lacking (Van de Ven & 
Polley, 1992). Behavioral tendencies of key R&D managers further aggravate the uncertainty 
because of incentives to over-estimate the rates of return to favored technological paths (Freeman 
& Soete, 1997). Therefore, even although decision makers may have crude estimates about the 
merits of several potential research projects early on, these estimates are often highly unreliable. 
In short, a priori decision making about which research projects to pursue is a misfortune if 
unreliable estimates can only improve ex post, i.e. during the actual project when additional 
information has been gathered (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). 
In contrast, development projects are far less uncertain in technological terms because they 
often start from a set of decisions about which technologies will be developed to commercial 
ends. These decisions in turn define stricter boundary conditions within which a firm will expend 
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further efforts. During development, firms work increasingly towards the implementation of 
innovations and, eventually, the introduction of new products and processes. Prior technological 
choices thus lock firms into development trajectories that become more proprietary and firm 
specific over time. 
With the distinction in mind between research and development, we expect that a portfolio 
of parallel R&D partnerships is most useful if the partnerships in such a portfolio focus strongly 
on basic and applied research. A portfolio of parallel R&D partnerships geared towards 
performing joint research, rather than development, will increase the reliability of estimates of 
total effort, time-line, costs, and performance prospects of the various technological options, 
before firms make irreversible investments in downstream development. Over time, firms in turn 
weed out the options with poor prospects and continue to develop the most promising ones. In 
line with Nelson (1961), we expect that the parallel pursuit of a number of joint R&D projects 
gravitating towards joint research is effective to hedge against potentially inaccurate decisions 
when firms’ knowledge about the future is fuzzy. 
Because the early stages of research are notoriously uncertain, they offer the clearest 
motivation for uncertainty reduction. For two reasons, they also seem to offer the best 
opportunities to reduce uncertainty. First, early-stage basic and applied research has fewer 
immediate implications for interfirm rivalry in downstream product markets than more close-to 
commercial activities such as the development and commercialization of concrete technologies, 
products, or processes (Harrigan 2003 [1985]: 380). Firms thus tend to be more open and 
perceptive to external knowledge sources during the early stages of research, whereas towards 
development, firms become increasingly secretive (Faems, Janssens, & Van Looy, 2007). 
The second opportunity factor is cost related. The early stage of an R&D effort tends to be 
significantly less costly than the later stage of an R&D effort. Parallel efforts early in a research 
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trajectory therefore reduce uncertainty in a cost-effective way. For example, data on US industrial 
R&D expenditures compiled by the US National Science Foundation show that, during the period 
1975-1999, only 23 to 31% of firms’ total R&D costs related to basic and applied research, 
whereas roughly 70 to 80% was dedicated to development activities (National Science 
Foundation, 2006: table 32). Similarly, Freeman and Soete (1997) indicate that the costs of basic 
and applied research are comparatively low in relation to the total costs of an innovation 
trajectory. A range of additional activities related to development, such as engineering, 
prototyping, and design, create major expenses at the later stages of the innovation process. 
To summarize, uncertainty reduction through an R&D partnership portfolio should be more 
effective when uncertainty is higher and so the knowledge-gathering effect of a portfolio of 
parallel R&D partnerships will be more positive when the portfolio focuses mainly on research 
rather than development. As in Nelson’s (1961: 356-357) model, the marginal benefit of an 
additional partnership, and the optimum number of projects to run in parallel, will thus be greater 
when the learning potential is greater. Hence, with increased research focus, the positive slope of 
the portfolio size effect (Hypothesis 1) will be steeper and the inflection point beyond which 
additional R&D partnerships have a negative impact will shift to the right. Empirical 
corroboration of these arguments would support descriptive work by Hagedoorn (1993), 
suggesting that firms in high tech environments often decrease technological uncertainties 
through a range of research-focused interfirm partnerships.2 
Hypothesis 3. The research focus of a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio positively 
moderates the curvilinear relationship between portfolio size and knowledge inflows, such 
that increasing research focus will increase the portfolio size that maximizes knowledge 
inflows. 
 
The research focus of a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio may also alter the effect that the 
partner mix within a portfolio has on inward knowledge flows. Early-stage experimental and 
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applied research is rife with uncertainties and requires the combination and recombination of bits 
of knowledge that are implicit, poorly objectified, and embedded within the context of individual 
firms (Kogut & Zander 1992; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Recognizing, identifying, and 
understanding the value of such knowledge will require significant efforts and so the more firms 
can rely on a basic, pre-established, understanding of their partners, the more they can mitigate 
any potential information-gathering problems (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Simonin, 1999; 
Zollo et al., 2002). This understanding is significantly greater when firms have collaborated 
before and so in a research-focused portfolio, firms should benefit more from a reliance on pre-
established routines shared with repeat partners. 
A portfolio with fewer novel partners admittedly loses some of its absolute knowledge 
gathering benefits because the marginal value of knowledge held by novel partners tends to be 
higher than that of repeat partners. Nevertheless, this knowledge is less useful if the focal firm 
cannot recognize, identify, and understand it, for example because it is implicit and poorly 
objectified (Simonin, 1999). 
By this logic, the marginal benefit of an additional novel partner, and the optimum number 
of novel partners, will thus be lower when technological uncertainty is greater. Hence, with 
increased research focus, the positive slope of the portfolio novelty effect (Hypothesis 2) will be 
flatter and the inflection point beyond which additional novel partners have a negative impact will 
shift to the left. Thus, knowledge gathering in a research-focused portfolio peaks at a lower 
(higher) share of novel (repeat) R&D partners, and its peak reaches a lower level, than knowledge 
gathering in a development-focused portfolio. 
Hypothesis 4. The research focus of a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio negatively 
moderates the curvilinear relationship between the share of novel partners and knowledge 
inflows, such that increasing research focus will decrease the share of novel partners that 
maximizes knowledge inflows. 
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From a knowledge-gathering perspective, these contingency hypotheses suggest that an 
optimal research-focused R&D partnership portfolio is larger, and its share of novel partners 
smaller, than an optimal development-focused portfolio. Crucially, these hypotheses assume 
constant the governance of the R&D partnerships in the portfolio.3 Transaction cost economics 
research (e.g., Oxley, 1997) has argued and shown that when technology is difficult to specify and 
uncertain, firms often choose more hierarchical governance modes to govern their partnerships. If 
a greater research focus in a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio reflects greater uncertainty 
(Roberts & Weitzman, 1981), then appropriability hazards should be greater and so a larger share 
of the R&D partnerships in the portfolio should be equity based, ceteris paribus.4 To account for 
such transaction cost concerns in our empirical analysis, we hold constant partnership governance 
(equity versus nonequity partnerships), which is widely recognized as an important ‘cure’ for 
transaction costs associated with transactional uncertainty (Mowery et al., 1996; Oxley, 1997). 
METHOD 
Data 
We use data from a database developed by researchers from Brandeis University and Maastricht 
University (see Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). This database contains data on R&D partnerships, 
patents and patent citations in the IT industry for the period 1975-1999. For the current paper, we 
added information from CATI, Osiris, Datastream, and firms’ annual reports. The Brandeis-
Maastricht database is a merger of parts of the CATI database on R&D partnerships (Hagedoorn, 
2002), the NBER patent data file (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2002), and Standard & Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT database. CATI contains detailed information on interfirm R&D partnerships 
starting in 1960, including partner identities, organizational form, and other specifics of the 
partnerships. The NBER patent data file contains detailed information on all utility patents 
granted by the USPTO since 1963, the citations among them (1975-2002), and information about 
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inventors and firms. COMPUSTAT contains a wide range of firm-level financial variables. 
IT includes segments such as computers, semiconductors, and communications, 
corresponding to patent classes for communications, computer hardware and software, computer 
peripherals, information storage and semiconductor devices (patent class subcategories 21-24 and 
46 in Hall et al. 2002). We use two rules sequentially for including firms in our estimation 
sample. First, a firm is included if it had at least one patent in patent classes for communications, 
computer hardware and software, computer peripherals, information storage and semiconductor 
devices in 1975-1999. Second, of the selected firms we include only those that had at least one 
R&D partnership in IT, devised to perform joint R&D and/or joint technology development. 
These two rules ensure that firms in the sample are, at a minimum, at risk of citing (or being cited 
by) a partner. The partnership/patent sample contains 152 firms, organized as an unbalanced panel 
of 1,836 firm-years. 
The longitudinal nature of our data necessarily leads to missing values for some of the key 
control variables. We include only those firm-years for which both firm- and partner-specific data 
are complete and delete others listwise. In addition, the lagging of independent variables and 
restrictions imposed by the count data models discard additional firm-year records from the 
analyses. Taken together, these steps lead to an effective sample size of 1,030 firm-years. Below, 
we probe the sensitivity of the analyses to this reduction in sample size. Further, our design might 
raise concerns of left censoring because some firms were already in business prior to our 
sampling window. However, the sample firms’ R&D partnership activity prior to 1975 was 
negligible. In fact, R&D partnering did not take serious shape until the second half of the eighties, 
although the IT industry took an early lead (Hagedoorn, 2002). 
Dependent Variable 
Following work by Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006), Mowery et al. (1996), Rosenkopf and Almeida 
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(2003), we use patent citations to proxy the inflows of technological knowledge from a firm’s 
R&D partners. Patent citations indicate that existing patents, representing ‘prior art’, were 
relevant for a new patent and, therefore, they likely represent the flow of knowledge between the 
citing and cited party. Some survey-based results indeed indicate that the flow of technological 
knowledge between actors is significantly larger when they cite each other’s patents (Duguet & 
MacGarvie, 2005; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000). Jaffe et al. (2000) concluded that 
aggregated, actor-centric citation measures are reasonable proxies for the intensity of knowledge 
flow between actors. 
We recognize that patents embody codified knowledge, whereas much of the technological 
knowledge in the innovation process is tacit (Appleyard, 1996). Yet, tracing tacit knowledge 
empirically is nearly impossible, especially given our longitudinal design. Instead, we align with 
Almeida et al. (2002: 152), Mowery et al. (1996: 83), and Patel and Pavitt (1997: 143) and 
assume that flows of codified and tacit knowledge are closely related and complementary. We 
thus abstract from the codified-tacit distinction and use the pattern of citations between firms’ 
patents to identify the magnitude of inflows of technological knowledge. 
Nevertheless, some recent work has called for caution when using patent citations to proxy 
flows of technological knowledge (Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006). For instance, part of the citations 
on a patent may be ‘strategic’, to avoid litigation only. More importantly, however, patent 
examiners or a firm’s lawyers might add citations to the patent that the inventors were not aware 
of themselves. Only since the 2001 change in U.S. patent reporting do patents contain a separate 
listing of inventor- and examiner-inserted citations. Our sampling period (1975-1999) thus 
precludes the use of a more fine-grained proxy. 
Despite these potential issues, we have five reasons to expect that patent citations are useful 
in our analyses of technological knowledge flows in the context of interfirm R&D partnerships. 
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First, interfirm R&D partnerships serve as embedded mechanisms in which people intervene to 
transfer technological knowledge (Autant-Bernard, 2001; Singh, 2005). As such, cooperating 
firms are most likely cognizant of partners’ relevant lines of research and pending patents. 
Second, violating a partner’s interests by wittingly excluding citations may harm a firm’s 
reputation as a trustworthy partner and, hence, restrict future cooperative possibilities. To 
illustrate, Harrigan (2003 [1985]: 342) drew from in-depth field studies of interfirm R&D 
partnerships to conclude that “…if a trusted partner chose to betray its partner by pirating 
intellectual property, word went out in the industry.”  Third, to protect its interests a firm has an 
incentive to monitor the applications of its partners and, if necessary, suggest citations to its own 
patents. Fourth, we have no reason to expect that examiners pattern their interventions on 
characteristics of an applicant’s R&D partnership portfolio. Hence, in our setting, examiner-
inserted citations should only add noise to the knowledge flow measures, without systematically 
(dis-)favoring particular firms. Finally, examiner-inserted citations appear especially troublesome 
for analyzing self-citations (Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006), which are beyond our theoretical and 
empirical focus. 
Besides these five reasons, we also cover a period in which the use of R&D partnerships 
flourished (Hagedoorn, 2002), generating important cross-sectional and longitudinal variation. 
Given the large number of patents and citations in our data, we expect that annual firm-level 
citation counts reveal a meaningful signal about the magnitude and direction of technological 
knowledge flows between partnered firms. We define Inward knowledge flows as the aggregate 
annual number of patent citations made by the focal firm to patents of its R&D partners. To evade 
simultaneity, this dependent variable takes a one-year lead to the independent variables and 
control variables. 
Independent Variables 
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Portfolio size is the count of R&D partnerships a firm maintains in t. To test hypothesis 1, we 
include in our models both a monotonic and squared portfolio size term. To test hypothesis 3, we 
interact portfolio size with our measure for portfolio research focus. 
We measure Portfolio novelty as a firm’s share of partners in t that it has never collaborated 
with before. This measure ranges between 0 and 1 and a higher value indicates that a firm 
maintains more partnerships with firms it has never previously collaborated with. For example, a 
value of 0.4 means that 40% of all of a firm’s R&D partners are novel to the firm and the other 
60% are repeat partners. To test hypothesis 2, we include in our models both a monotonic and 
squared portfolio novelty term. To test hypothesis 4, we interact portfolio novelty with our 
measure for portfolio research focus. Our findings are robust to treating as novel those partners 
that a firm has not otherwise collaborated with in the past five years (rather than ever). 
Whereas much prior work has distinguished R&D partnerships from a variety of other 
partnership types such as second-sourcing deals, marketing, licensing, royalty and sales 
agreements (e.g., Lavie, 2007; Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011), we identify an R&D 
partnership’s research focus (we split the R from the D). Convergent with OECD guidelines for 
distinguishing types of R&D (OECD, 2002: 77-82), we distinguish partnerships that focus on 
basic and applied research on the one hand from those focusing on development activities on the 
other. We exploit the granular categorical information about the cooperative forms of the 
partnerships contained in CATI. In particular, we consider partnerships that fall into one of four 
categories: (1) joint research pacts, (2) joint development agreements, (3) joint ventures, and (4) 
research corporations. Categories (1) and (4) unambiguously indicate a focus on basic and applied 
research. Category (2) unambiguously indicates a focus on development. However, category (3) is 
ambiguous. For example, detailed inspection of partnership announcements reveals that this 
category contains partnerships that may focus on either research or development. Therefore, we 
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label partnerships in category (3) as research focused only if the public announcement clearly 
indicated that the partnership focuses on basic and/or applied research activities rather than the 
development of existing technologies. 
To summarize, we code a partnership as research focused if it is a joint research pact, a 
research corporation, or if it is a joint venture with an explicit focus on research. Using this dyad-
level coding, we calculate Portfolio research focus as a firm’s share of partnerships with a 
distinctive research focus in t. To test hypothesis 3, we evaluate the interaction between portfolio 
size and portfolio research focus. To test hypothesis 4, we evaluate the interaction between 
portfolio novelty and portfolio research focus.5 
Control Variables 
We test our hypotheses net of a rich control model of knowledge inflows. This model reflects that 
knowledge inflows are a function of firm, partner, and portfolio properties (Greve, 2005; 
Kalaignanam, Shankar, & Varadarajan, 2007) and we include a full set of year dummies (1975-
1998, omitting 1999) that capture unobserved temporal effects. 
Firm controls. Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total sales in t (using values in millions of 
U.S. dollars). We control for firm size as larger firms tend to have more financial and managerial 
resources, and more partnerships than smaller ones. This in turn influences their investments and 
attractiveness for cooperation in R&D partnerships. We define the variable Profitability as the 
ratio of a firm’s operating income to its sales in t. A firm’s profitability possibly signals that it 
successfully commercialized new technologies. In addition, the firm can use profits to invest in 
new technological activities. 
To control for the confounding effects of innovativeness, we include the variable R&D 
intensity as the ratio of a firm’s R&D spending to its sales in t. A firm’s innovativeness likely 
reflects its absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), which should ease the assimilation of 
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externally generated technological knowledge. In addition, increases in firms’ technological 
inputs broaden the scope for complementarities to exploit, which may lead to the formation of 
additional partnerships (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). Patent stock measures the size of a firm’s 
patent stock in t. To control for a firm’s overall patent citing activity, we include Total citations 
made, indexing the total number of patent citations made by the focal firm in a given year. 
Because any unobserved, time varying, factors would be manifest in the total number of citations 
a firm makes to others’ patents, these factors should not confound our analysis and so this control 
helps us to rule out a number of time-varying sources of unobserved heterogeneity. 
We include the variable Partnering experience that measures the count of R&D partnerships 
a firm has entered by t. Evolutionary theory states that a firm’s past pursuit of technological 
knowledge is important for new searches (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Hence, a firm’s partnering 
experience may ease the search for knowledge. Further, recent work reveals that more 
experienced firms may develop a dedicated alliance management function, which would enable 
the coordination of collaborative activities across a portfolio of partnerships (Heimeriks, 
Duysters, & Vanhaverbeke, 2007; Sarkar, Aulakh, & Madhok, 2009). 
Partner controls. We include a number of partner-specific measures that capture their 
potential value as sources of knowledge. Size is the mean value of partners’ logged sales in t. 
Profitability is the mean value of partners’ operating income divided by sales in t. R&D intensity 
is the mean value of partners’ R&D spending divided by sales in t. Patent stock is the mean value 
of the size of partners’ patent stock in t. Finally, to control for partners’ overall numbers of patent 
citations received, we include Total citations received as the mean value of the total number of 
patent citations received by the patents of a firm’s partners in t. 
Portfolio controls. Bilateral competition is a firm’s proportion of partners active in its own 
primary 3-digit SIC in t. Firms that cooperate in IT may nevertheless compete in product markets 
   
21 
 
 
(Mowery et al., 1996). We thus control for the extent to which partners are active in primary 
product markets identical to the focal firm (Lavie, 2007). To account for the effects of equity 
partnerships on technological knowledge flows (Almeida et al., 2002; Mowery et al., 1996), we 
include the variable Equity partnerships as a firm’s share of equity-based partnerships. This 
variable is bounded by 0 and 1, and a value closer to 1 indicates a higher share of equity-based 
partnerships. We control for geographic explanations of technological knowledge flows and 
include the variable Regional concentration, which is the proportion of a firm’s partners in its 
home region. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, and a value closer to 1 indicates a higher share of 
intraregional partnerships. We use the home country of a firm’s headquarters to classify firms in 
one of four regions: the United States, Europe, Japan, and Other regions. 
Statistical Method 
Our statistical model allows us to obtain estimates of the determinants of the amount of 
partnership-related knowledge flowing into firm i in year t+1, Kit+1. Specifically: 
E(Kit+1Xit , Cit , αt , δi)  exp[βXXit + βCCit + βααt + δi] , 
where Xit is a time-varying vector of independent variables, and their interactions, characterizing 
firm i; Cit is a time-varying vector of control variables characterizing firm i; αt is a vector of year 
dummies; and δi represents unobserved time-invariant firm effects not captured by the 
independent and control variables. We use a conditional fixed effects negative binomial 
specification to estimate this model (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984), which accommodates the 
discrete, nonnegative, and overdispersed nature of the dependent variable. Further, it partials out 
time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity by conditioning on firms’ total partnership-related 
inward knowledge flows during the sampling window (Hausman et al., 1984: 923-924). Though 
this conditioning procedure drops firms for which the dependent variable is zero in the entire 
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sampling period, the estimates are unbiased and consistent (for the proof, see Hausman et al., 
1984: 935). Though we also estimated random effects negative binomial models, Hausman (1978) 
specification tests consistently indicated that the use of random effects specifications would have 
generated parameter inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are due to correlations between 
unobserved firm effects and the covariate matrices, providing prima facie evidence for persistent 
differences between the sample firms. We therefore report results based on fixed effects 
specifications that produce firm-specific intercepts. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. Most correlation coefficients 
are low in magnitude, though a few are somewhat higher (> .80). Unreported analyses indicated 
that all variance inflation factors had a value less than 10. To address the potential impact of 
multicollinearity on the standard errors of the estimates of our key independent variables, we 
centered these variables on their means prior to calculation of the squared and interaction terms. 
An average of 16% of firms’ R&D partnerships was research focused, which mirrors R&D data 
provided by the National Science Foundation (NSF 2006: table 32), showing that U.S. firms spent 
about 20 to 30% of their full R&D budget on basic and applied research during 1975-1999.  
--- Insert tables 1, 2, and 3 about here --- 
Table 3 shows our findings regarding inward knowledge flows. The control variables show 
some persistent results. Inward knowledge flows increase with firm size, indicating that larger 
firms attract more knowledge. In addition, a firm’s total citations made correlates positively with 
inward knowledge flows. Partnering experience also generally increases inward knowledge flows. 
A firm’s profitability, R&D intensity, and patent stock have no significant effects on inward 
knowledge flows. Of the partner controls, only the size of partners’ patent stock affects inward 
knowledge flows, which perhaps indicates that the other partner controls may matter more at the 
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level of individual partnerships rather than in the aggregate. These results thus suggest that the 
most important partner-level factor affecting inward knowledge flows is the mere size of the 
citable stock of knowledge within a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio. 
Inward knowledge flows increase with the share of equity partnerships in a portfolio, 
confirming previous findings by Mowery et al. (1996), who show that knowledge flows are 
greater in equity partnerships. Finally, firms with a high proportion of partners in their home 
region experience lower inward knowledge flows. This surprising yet consistent finding may 
reflect that firms’ choice of foreign partners is endogenous to expected knowledge flows, which 
in turn explains why firms that do have international partners face fewer difficulties in attracting 
knowledge (Lavie & Miller, 2008). Moreover, Peri (2005) shows that technological knowledge in 
especially the computer sector flows significantly farther internationally than in a number of other 
sectors. 
Hypotheses 
In support of hypothesis 1, models 2-6 show a positive and significant main effect, and a negative 
and significant squared effect, for portfolio size. Models 3, 5, and 6 show a positive and 
significant main effect, and a negative and significant squared effect, for portfolio novelty, which 
supports hypothesis 2. Models 4 and 6 show that the interaction between portfolio size and 
portfolio research focus is significant and positive, in line with hypothesis 3. Figure 1 shows this 
contingency effect. When a firm focuses its portfolio on development rather than research (i.e., 
portfolio research focus = 0), the multiplier of inward knowledge flows peaks around a portfolio 
size of 11, with a multiplier of 1.47 (=exp[0.068*11-0.003*11*11+0.074*11*0]). Yet, when a 
firm focuses its portfolio on research rather than development (i.e., portfolio research focus = 1), 
the multiplier of inward knowledge flows peaks around a portfolio size of 24, with a much larger 
multiplier of 5.37 (=exp[0.068*24-0.003*24*24+0.074*24*1]). Thus, convergent with our theory, 
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parallel partnerships are significantly more valuable for knowledge inflows when the focus of 
these partnerships is on research rather than development. 
--- Insert figures 1 and 2 about here --- 
Models 5 and 6 show that the interaction between portfolio novelty and portfolio research 
focus is significant and negative, in line with hypothesis 4. Figure 2 shows this contingency 
effect. When a firm focuses its portfolio on development rather than research (i.e., portfolio 
research focus = 0), the multiplier of inward knowledge flows peaks when the share of novel 
partners is around 0.5, with a multiplier of 1.37 (=exp[1.291*0.5-1.315*0.5*0.5-0.617*0.5*0]). 
Yet, when a firm focuses its portfolio on research rather than development (i.e., portfolio research 
focus = 1), the multiplier of inward knowledge flows peaks when the share of novel partners is 
around 0.3, with a much smaller multiplier of 1.09 (=exp[1.291*0.3-1.315*0.3*0.3-
0.617*0.3*1]). Thus, in line with our theory, the effect of portfolio novelty is less positive when 
the portfolio focuses on research rather than development. 
Robustness Checks 
First, as with any model relating interorganizational design to outcomes, endogeneity may affect 
our estimates (Bascle, 2008). Specifically, knowledge inflows may systematically condition 
firms’ R&D partnership formation. Nevertheless, a generalized Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2-test 
(Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993: 237-240) failed to reject the null hypothesis that the fixed effects 
negative binomial coefficients for the three potentially endogenous partnership variables of 
interest (i.e. portfolio size, portfolio research focus, and portfolio novelty) were consistent. As 
only statistical proof of coefficient inconsistency would suggest endogeneity issues, we are 
confident that endogeneity has not materially affected our empirical estimates. This finding 
perhaps indicates that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity has reduced systematic 
endogeneity to random fluctuations (Heckman, 1979), that there is no feedback, or that 
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knowledge inflows affect R&D partnership formation in multiple ways, resulting in an overall 
insignificant effect.6 
Second, we generated alternative estimates to further rule out the influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the spirit of Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1995) and Blundell, Griffith, 
and Windmeijer (2002), we added firms’ pre-sample history of knowledge inflows to the 
conditional fixed effects models in table 3. The rationale for pre-sample fixed effects is that any 
firm-specific dispositional differences should be manifest in firms’ knowledge inflows prior to 
the study period, making a measure capturing such pre-sample inflows a suitable index of 
persistent unobserved firm differences. With this additional control complementing the 
conditional fixed effects estimator, the original results remained identical.7 
Alternatively, we estimated an unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model – i.e., a 
cross-sectional negative binomial model with dummies for firms. As Allison and Waterman 
(2002: 250-252, 255-256) argue, because Hausman et al.’s (1984: 922) parameterization of the 
negative binomial distribution may not eliminate all time-invariant firm effects, an unconditional 
estimator should be preferred. Rather than eliminating them from the likelihood function, this 
estimator captures firm fixed effects through firm dummies. Admittedly inefficient, the 
unconditional estimator nevertheless generated coefficients and significance levels that were 
broadly identical to the ones presented in table 3. Together, these two alternative specifications 
further increase our confidence in the results, as the coefficients of interest are unlikely to be 
systematic shadows of unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Finally, we investigated if the results were sensitive to the reduction in effective sample size 
due to missing values. We first ran the complete models excluding the controls with missing 
values. This increased the effective sample size to 1,322 firm-years. Though none of the 
coefficients changed direction, previously insignificant effects turned significant, suggesting the 
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importance of the omitted controls. Thus, we probed this issue further because missing values 
would bias our estimates if they occurred non-randomly. We tested for this potential selection 
bias by estimating a two-stage selection model (Allison, 2001: 79-81; Heckman, 1979). In the 
first stage, we estimated the probability of non-missing values in the full panel using robust 
probit regression. In the second stage, we estimated the full model including the inverse Mills 
ratio based on the first-stage probit estimates to correct for the probability of non-missing values. 
Results remained identical, indicating missing values did not bias our parameter estimates. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored how a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio affected inward flows of 
technological knowledge from its partners. We linked research on parallel search and joint R&D 
to show that the size of a firm’s R&D partnership portfolio and its share of novel partners both 
have an inverted U-shaped effect on the inflow of technological knowledge from the firm’s R&D 
partners. In addition, we showed that these direct effects vary as a function of the level of 
technological uncertainty within the portfolio. Together, these findings reveal the value of 
invoking a portfolio perspective to study knowledge flows in interfirm R&D partnerships. 
 We wish to emphasize two broad contributions. First, our focus on the amount of 
knowledge a firm gathers from its R&D partners helps us move beyond conclusions about 
portfolios and knowledge flows deriving from studies connecting partnership portfolios to 
innovative outputs or those connecting partnership dyads to knowledge flows. Direct attention to 
knowledge flows as the mechanism connecting R&D partnership portfolios to performance is an 
important step to bridge the gap between theory on knowledge flows in R&D partnership 
portfolios and available empirical evidence. Results show that a firm achieves the greatest 
knowledge inflows with a portfolio of intermediate size and with a balanced mix of novel and 
repeat partners. The portfolio size result strongly mirrors early research on parallel R&D within 
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firms (Nelson, 1961), suggesting the existence of an optimum portfolio size. While small 
portfolios do not sufficiently allow for uncertainty reduction through knowledge gathering, those 
that are too large will provide less useful information and increase burdens on their management. 
 The result regarding the mix of novel and repeat partners suggests that neither a sole 
reliance on repeat partners, nor a sole reliance on novel partners leads to the greatest inflow of 
knowledge in a high tech environment where both firm-specific and industry-level uncertainties 
blur innovation-related decisions. Though repeat partnering allows a firm to benefit from 
relational routines that may ease the exchange of technological knowledge, novel partners are 
likely to carry information with a higher marginal value. Thus, a balanced portfolio should 
optimally combine the benefits of relational routines with higher marginal returns of information 
drawn from novel partners. In addition, this finding suggests that an R&D portfolio may serve as 
an integrating mechanism joining novel and extant knowledge. This is similar to Katila and 
Ahuja (2002), who suggest that useful innovations emerge in particular when an integrating 
mechanism joins extant and novel perspectives. We think further study of the integrating 
capability that appears endogenous to firms’ R&D partnership portfolio activities is warranted. 
At a more general level, our portfolio perspective on knowledge inflows aligns with recent 
interest among scholars and practitioners, who increasingly note that partnership portfolios 
represent an important level of analysis, above and beyond individual partnerships (Bamford & 
Ernst, 2002; Gulati, 2007; Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Mahnke, Overby, & Nielsen, 2006; 
Munson & Spivey, 2006; Parise & Sasson, 2002; Wassmer, 2010; Wassmer, Dussauge, & 
Planellas, 2010). Like internal project portfolios, external partnership portfolios exhibit aggregate 
compositional properties with crucial implications for understanding firm behavior and 
performance. Our findings suggest that interfirm knowledge flows can be usefully analyzed and 
understood when cast as a function of portfolio characteristics like size and partner mix. 
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The second, and related, contribution concerns our theoretical and empirical treatment of 
technological uncertainty as a contingency to the relationship between R&D partnership 
portfolios and knowledge inflows. Consistent with early work on parallel R&D within firms 
(Abernathy & Rosenbloom, 1969; Nelson, 1961), we find that when firms focus their joint R&D 
activities on basic and applied research rather than development, the optimum portfolio size, and 
the absolute amount of knowledge to be gathered, becomes significantly larger. Thus, parallel 
R&D projects are significantly more beneficial for knowledge gathering in the research stages of 
innovation projects, when technological uncertainty is greatest. 
Moreover, beyond affecting the knowledge gathering effect of portfolio size, technological 
uncertainty also affects the relationship between the portfolio’s partner mix and knowledge 
inflows. Our findings robustly reveal that knowledge gathering in a research-focused portfolio 
peaks at a lower share of novel R&D partners than knowledge gathering in a development-
focused portfolio. In the face of greater technological uncertainty typical for a research-focused 
portfolio, firms thus benefit more from pre-established routines because they help mitigate 
information-gathering problems. In addition, the higher marginal value of information potentially 
drawn from novel partners is less relevant when technological uncertainty makes that information 
particularly hard to recognize, identify, and understand (Simonin, 1999). 
More broadly, our contingency perspective contributes to recent work on alliance networks 
and portfolios (e.g., Gilsing et al., 2008; Lavie et al., 2011; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 
2000), which shows that the performance consequences of firms’ embeddedness within a network 
of partnerships vary with the types of projects comprising those portfolios. These studies test the 
broader idea that the heterogeneity of projects within a firm’s portfolio of partnerships, or across 
portfolios of different firms, will have implications for optimal portfolio design. In our case, the 
optimal portfolio for highly uncertain, early-stage basic and applied research differs from the 
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portfolio optimal for less uncertain development projects. We believe that the focus on task 
contingencies (here, research versus development) within recent work has the potential to 
generate insight into the functioning of partnership portfolios with much closer applicability in 
practice than unifying approaches arguing for one optimal portfolio design. 
To test our contingency hypotheses, we used granular information drawn from partnership 
announcements to identify the research versus development focus of the R&D partnerships in our 
sample. Though each individual partnership represents specific technological problems that are 
not necessarily captured by our research-development dichotomy, we believe that decomposing 
R&D partnerships into joint research and joint development is an important step to arrive at a 
more fine-grained understanding of portfolio effects in firms’ external R&D partnership activities. 
Admittedly posing a research challenge when announcement data are scarce or dubious, we hope 
that our first look here spurs further study. 
Our study does not come without some caveats that might encourage further study beyond 
the above suggestions. First, measuring technological knowledge flows using patent citations has 
well-known shortcomings. Despite recent changes enabling the isolation of examiner-added 
citations, some degree of noise to the information caught in patent citations will remain. 
Alternative measures with less noise may be found outside the realm of patents. Obviously, 
standard single-respondent-per-firm survey research runs the risk of single respondent, common 
methods bias, in particular when it concerns technological knowledge flows for firms with vast 
R&D resources and multiple R&D units and innovation centers. Although multiple-respondent-
per-firm survey research could provide some additional insights, the cost of such research is 
significant. Nevertheless, for science-based industries such as IT, a combination of patent 
citations and bibliometric research on joint publications and scientific citations might reveal 
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Second, we focused on one industry, albeit a broad one. The pattern of knowledge flow in 
relation to dimensions of firms’ R&D partnership portfolios thus perhaps reflects characteristics 
of the industry’s knowledge base. Even though our theory did not rely on idiosyncratic features of 
the IT industry, an obvious question for further research is to what extent portfolio effects we 
found play a role across a range of industries in which uncertainty blurs decisions about the 
development of novel technologies, products, and processes. 
Our understanding of interfirm R&D partnerships has increased considerably in recent years. 
We further this understanding by presenting and testing a firm-level portfolio perspective on 
knowledge flows within such partnerships, and by highlighting technological uncertainty as an 
important contingency within this portfolio perspective. We hope our findings stimulate further 
research linking dimensions of R&D partnership portfolios to knowledge flows, innovation, and 
economic performance at the firm level. 
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Figure 1: Portfolio Size, Research Focus, and Inward Knowledge Flows 
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Figure 2: Portfolio Novelty, Research Focus, and Inward Knowledge Flows 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable     
Inward knowledge flows 58.416 257.764 0 5,112 
Independent variables     
Portfolio size 4.387 5.611 1 36 
Portfolio research focus 0.160 0.294 0 1 
Portfolio novelty 0.369 0.415 0 1 
Firm controls     
Size 3.438 0.888 0.930 5.188 
Profitability 0.142 0.132 -1.104 0.624 
R&D intensity 0.091 0.099 0 0.708 
Patent stock 516.855 1,155.485 1 12,352 
Total citations made 260.485 851.618 0 16,205 
Partnering experience 7.528 14.336 1 141 
Partner controls     
Size 3.907 0.619 1.242 5.188 
Profitability 0.148 0.079 -0.560 0.482 
R&D intensity 0.086 0.056 0.003 0.893 
Patent stock  1,533.404 1,810.209 1 12,352 
Total citations received 635.357 1,193.549 0 11,378 
Portfolio controls     
Bilateral competition 0.185 0.305 0 1 
Equity partnerships 0.152 0.265 0 1 
Regional concentration 0.840 0.299 0 1 
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Table 2: Bivariate Correlations 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
 Dependent variable                  
1 Inward knowledge flows                  
 Independent variables                  
2 Portfolio size 0.56                 
3 Portfolio research focus 0.18 0.23                
4 Portfolio novelty -0.08 -0.19 -0.07               
 Firm controls                  
5 Size 0.24 0.45 0.28 -0.12              
6 Profitability 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.17             
7 R&D intensity -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.38 -0.39            
8 Patent stock 0.59 0.65 0.23 -0.10 0.49 0.07 -0.10           
9 Total citations made 0.85 0.58 0.20 -0.10 0.32 0.08 -0.03 0.77          
10 Partnering experience 0.62 0.93 0.23 -0.20 0.39 0.09 -0.02 0.70 0.67         
 Partner controls                  
11 Size 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.24 0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03        
12 Profitability 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04       
13 R&D intensity 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.36 -0.23      
14 Patent stock 0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.54 0.08 -0.09     
15 Total citations received 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.37 0.06 -0.04 0.83    
 Portfolio controls                  
16 Bilateral competition -0.02 -0.01 0.13 0.04 -0.20 0.16 0.09 -0.15 -0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.03   
17 Equity partnerships 0.30 0.40 0.33 -0.02 0.35 0.04 -0.03 0.42 0.32 0.36 0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.06  
18 Regional concentration -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.14 -0.15 -0.21 -0.12 -0.02 -0.11 0.07 -0.17 -0.21 -0.08 0.21 -0.08 
 Correlations  |0.06| are significant at p < .05; correlations  |0.08| are significant at or beyond p < .01. 
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Table 3: Conditional fixed effects negative binomial models of inward knowledge flows, 1975-1999 
Variables 
Hypothesis 
and sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables        
Portfolio research focus  0.517** 0.305 0.307 0.222 0.356+ 0.254 
  (0.184) (0.186) (0.188) (0.190) (0.194) (0.199) 
Portfolio size 1: +  0.098*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
(Portfolio size)2 1: -  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Portfolio novelty 2: +   1.277***  1.351*** 1.291*** 
    (0.311)  (0.316) (0.316) 
(Portfolio novelty)2 2: -   -1.305***  -1.356*** -1.315*** 
    (0.320)  (0.323) (0.321) 
Portfolio size × portf. research focus 3: +    0.082**  0.074* 
     (0.031)  (0.032) 
Portfolio novelty × portf. research focus 4: -     -0.676* -0.617* 
      (0.280) (0.292) 
Firm controls        
Firm size  0.651*** 0.456*** 0.444*** 0.464*** 0.428*** 0.444*** 
  (0.103) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) 
Firm profitability  0.552 0.481 0.544 0.547 0.600 0.636 
  (0.444) (0.440) (0.439) (0.443) (0.445) (0.445) 
Firm R&D intensity  1.928* 0.891 0.675 0.839 0.591 0.587 
  (0.844) (0.937) (0.925) (0.945) (0.926) (0.933) 
Firm patent stock (× 102)  -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm total citations made (× 102)  0.007** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm partnering experience  0.008* 0.011* 0.014** 0.007 0.013* 0.009+ 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Partner controls        
Partner size  -0.216 -0.062 -0.098 -0.003 -0.110 -0.050 
  (0.135) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
Partner profitability  -1.154 -0.967 -0.854 -0.899 -0.821 -0.740 
  (0.732) (0.729) (0.728) (0.723) (0.726) (0.722) 
Partner R&D intensity  -2.906 -0.771 -0.873 -0.970 -1.188 -1.214 
  (1.851) (1.891) (1.882) (1.886) (1.894) (1.885) 
Partner patent stock (× 102)  0.036*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Partner total citations received (× 102)  -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.003 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Portfolio controls        
Bilateral competition  0.137 0.184 0.157 0.273 0.170 0.253 
  (0.237) (0.242) (0.243) (0.241) (0.242) (0.242) 
Equity partnerships  1.033*** 0.627** 0.754*** 0.582** 0.807*** 0.729*** 
  (0.205) (0.211) (0.212) (0.213) (0.216) (0.219) 
Regional concentration  -0.650*** -0.674*** -0.661*** -0.743*** -0.686*** -0.741*** 
  (0.189) (0.200) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.199) 
        
Constant  -2.191+ -1.893 -1.348 -2.112+ -1.250 -1.505 
  (1.229) (1.249) (1.262) (1.249) (1.261) (1.263) 
Log likelihood (significance versus (1))  -2,689.80 -2,664.50*** -2,656.05*** -2,661.16*** -2,654.40*** -2,652.68*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; n = 1,030. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year 
fixed effects. The dependent variable takes a one-year lead. We centered the independent variables on their means 
prior to calculation of the squared and interaction terms. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1. Recent work in the literature on teams also emphasizes the importance of team 
composition for performance. For example, Perretti and Negro (2007) studied the Hollywood 
feature film industry, showing that film genre innovation increased both with the number of 
newcomers and with the number of new combinations between newcomers and ‘old-timers’ 
within the project team. Another recent study by Ferriani, Cattani, and Baden-Fuller (2009), also 
studying the Hollywood feature film industry, showed that a film producer’s commercial 
performance first increased and then decreased with the percentage of team members that had 
previously collaborated. While at a different level of analysis, these results are consistent with 
our theoretical mechanisms: because newcomers (in our case: novel R&D partners of the focal 
firm) provide novel perspectives and old-timers (in our case: repeat R&D partners of the focal 
firm) provide coordination advantages necessary for effective interaction, a mixture of old-timers 
and newcomers should optimize performance. 
2. One might argue that large, research-focused, R&D partnership portfolios should also 
increase the outflow of technological knowledge to a firm’s R&D partners. Though this may be 
the case, such knowledge outflows disperse across a firm’s partners and so individual partners 
need not benefit from them. Additional analysis using the total partnership-related outflow of 
technological knowledge as dependent variable indicated that large, research-focused, portfolios 
did not significantly affect the outflow of technological knowledge. These results are available 
upon request. 
3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us of the importance of this assumption. 
Our theoretical focus on coordination and knowledge-gathering benefits within R&D partnership 
portfolios does not discount the substantive relevance of appropriation concerns inherent in 
interfirm R&D partnerships. 
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4. Our measures for research focus and partnership governance indeed correlate at the .33 
level. The linear association between the two variables remains strongly significant and positive 
when the other independent variables are held constant. These results are available upon request. 
5. The specification incorporating the interaction between the squared portfolio size term 
and research focus did not significantly improve the model fit and the additional interaction effect 
was not significant. This result was identical for portfolio novelty. To conserve space, we present 
the more parsimonious models incorporating the interactions between the respective main effects 
instead. 
6. Firms with greater knowledge inflows may be motivated to seek more opportunities to 
learn, by expanding their portfolio of R&D partnerships (Powell et al., 1996). Yet, it is equally 
plausible that others view fast learners (i.e. expropriators that absorb, rather than reveal, 
information) as suboptimal partners (Harrigan, 2003 [1985]), which would shrink the opportunity 
space for potential partnerships. This counterbalances the portfolio-enlarging effect of a firm’s 
search motivation. Thus, theory runs in two directions, which perhaps explains the insignificant 
effect we find. The logic concerning a possible feedback effect of knowledge inflows to portfolio 
research focus runs along similar lines. Finally, the feedback effect to portfolio novelty is not 
obvious. We tested it nevertheless, as some work shows that repeat partnering is a systematic 
decision (Gulati, 1995). Nevertheless, knowledge inflows do not systematically shift the balance 
of novel vs. repeat partners in our sample. 
7. Frank Windmeijer provided helpful comments on the pre-sample estimator. Blundell et 
al. (1995, 2002) originally used a pre-sample approach to capture unobserved heterogeneity in 
dynamic patent rate models. Here, the pre-sample approach complements Hausman et al.’s 
(1984) conditioning procedure to weed out firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. We added the 4-
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year pre-sample mean of inward knowledge flows in the analyses. Patent citation data are not 
available prior to 1975 and so a 4-year pre-sample period and a one-year lead of the dependent 
variable only allowed us to predict knowledge inflows from 1980 onwards. Using a Hausman 
(1978) specification test, we compared the resulting coefficients to the ones of the models for 
1980-1999 that omitted the pre-sample mean estimator. With no exceptions, differences were 
non-systematic, which further increased our confidence in the results reported in table 3. 
